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UNIONS: AN END OR A MEANS?

UNIONS: AN END OR A MEANS?

I

CHARLES V. LAUGHLIN*

Doctrine resulting from the decision of the legal problem of general interest presented by Marshall Field & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,1 can be only narrowly distinguished from other established doctrine apparently antagonistic to the results of that case. The
distinction, although fine, may be regarded as valid, and it presents
underlying considerations fundamental to our jurisprudence of labor
relations. The important issue for decision in the Marshall Field case
was whether an employer can exclude non-employee union organizers
from parts of its premises not open to the public, when those organizers
seek to enter for the purpose of persuading employees, who are not
on duty at the time, to join the union.2 In reversing the National
Labor Relations Board on that issue 3 the United States Court of Appeals held that the making of such an exclusion falls within the employer's power and therefore does not constitute an unfair labor practice. Prior to this decision it had become well settled by the United
States Supreme Court4 that an employer cannot forbid employee
union organizers from using the employer's premises to solicit union
membership from other employees.5 As the distinction between employee union organizers and non-employee union organizers seems to
be narrow, the Marshall Field decision might appear to be antagonistic
to Supreme Court doctrine. That the distinction, even if fine, is fundamental, and that no doctrinal inconsistency has resulted from this
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
1aoo F. (2d) 375 (C. A. 7th, 1952) (no application for certiorari).
2
There were a number of other issues presented to the court which were undoubtedly important to the litigating parties. However, the problems presented
were primarily factual in their nature, and not deemed to be of sufficient doctrinal
value to merit discussion in this article. It is believed that to discuss those questions
would divert attention from the particular issue of the case thought to be fundamental to our labor law thinking.
The Labor Board order in Marshall Field & Co., and Retail Clerks of International Association, Local No. I 5 s5 -M.F. A.F.L., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952), was
modified by the Court of Appeals, and, as modified, enforced. The court eliminated
that part of the order pertinent to the problem here discussed.
'Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B. and N.L.R.B. v. Le Tourneau Co. of
Georgia, 324 U. S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982, 89 L ed. 1372, 157 A.L.R. io8i (1945).
sThere are several qualifications to this doctrine which will be discussed more
fully infra. It may be mentioned at this point that the most important qualification
is that solicitation must be during non-working periods-i.e., both the soliciting and
the solicited employees must be off duty.
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recent judicial pronouncement, must be shown by development. Such
an exposition is here attempted.
Possibly it is accurate to assert that only two prior historical events
have presented as fundamental an impact upon our labor law as the
enactment of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.6 First,
the Statute of Laborers7 was enacted in the fourteenth century to
counteract the advantageous position in which such workers as survived the Black Death found themselves. By enactment the duty to
work was established, s and wages were fixed.9 Since no worker could
individually ask for more than the government allowed, any notion
of collective bargaining was unthinkable. Second, following the decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 0 the doctrine that the formation
of a labor union constituted a criminal conspiracy rapidly disappeared." Thus, employees acquired the privileges of forming unions
and collectively bargaining for higher wages. Referring to Hohfeldian
terminology, the word "privileges" is used advisedly in contrast to
the word "rights."' 2 Collective bargaining through unions was no
longer illegal, per se, and could be indulged in to the extent that
employers were willing to bargain collectively. There was no duty upon
an employer to do so. True "rights" to self organization and to bargain
collectively are conferred upon all employees in industries affecting
interstate commerce by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
Section 8 of said Act'3 imposes upon employers the duty of respecting
the rights guaranteed to employees in Section 7 by declaring, among
other things, that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
"interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7." Thus the rights conferred by Section
7 are really "rights" and not mere "privileges." Section 7 is the fundamental feature of the Labor Relations Act. The balance of the Act is
4
elaborative.
629 U. S. C. § 157 (1935)-25

Edw. 3, St. i.

'There was no concept of involuntary servitude in those days.
'See Landis, Historical Introduction to Cases on Labor Law (1934) c. 1. This same
historical introduction appears in the Second Edition (1942) of the compilation of
cases edited by James M. Landis and Marcus Manoff.
1045 Mass. 111 (1842).
"See Gregory, Labor And The Law (1946) 29, 30.
2'See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial
Reasoning (1913) 23 Yale L. J. 16.
"29 U. S. C. § 158 (1935)"'Contrary to much popular opinion, this fundamental of the National Labor
Relations Act (the so-called "Wagner Act") is in no way mutilated by the Labor
Management Relations Act (the so-called "Taft-Hartley Act"), 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
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It is axiomatic that the law protects the interests of employers in
conducting their enterprises as they see fit. This legal protection is usually referred to as the employers' "property rights."13 Historically there
was little legal limitation upon the capacity of employers to govern
their relationships with their employees. Adair v. United States 6 and
Coppage v. Kansas,'7 properly understood, recognize that employers
had extensive privileges supported by an immunity against legislative
interference. This privilege-plus-immunity type of protection which the
law gave to employers finally developed into a true right in Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell. s
The rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively, created by Section 7 of the Labor Relations Act, are bound to conflict
with and limit, the pre-existing privileges, immunities, and rights of employers to govern their relations with their employees. Clearly the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that these management
prerogatives have not been entirely swept away. 19 The Labor Relations Act was construed as not interfering with "the normal exercise
of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge
them." 20 The problem has been to draw the line between the rights
conferred upon employees by Section 7 of the Labor Relations Act, and
the "normal" so-called property rights of employers. In no category of
labor law problems is this problem more manifest than in questions
arising out of the antagonism between the claims of employees to increase the power of their unions by unrestrained proselyting of new
members, and the claims of employers for the exclusive control of
their premises and of such of their employees' time as they have paid
for.
Under Section 8 of the Labor Relations Act, maneuvers of employers designed to frustrate employees in the exercise of their rights
2
guaranteed by Section 7 are declared to be "unfair labor practices." '
In understanding the specific issue presented by the Marshall Field
=The terms "property" and "property rights" are not very useful because of
their vagueness. A searching semantic analysis of those terms is long overdue. Such
a study is beyond the legitimate scope of this comment. When its use cannot be
avoided
the term "property rights" will be used as here indicated.
1
12o8 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. ed. 436 (igo8).
1.236 U. S. 1, 36 S. Ct. 240, 59 L. ed. 44 1 (1915).
'p245 U. S. 22 9 , 38 S. Ct. 65, 62 L. ed. 229 (1917).
2'Labor Board v. Jones and Laughlin, 3o U. S. 1, 43 et seq., 57 S. Ct. 615, 627 et
seq., 81 L. ed. 893, 915 et seq., so8 A. L. R. 1352, 1368 et seq. (1937).
-3o01 U. S. 1, 45, 57 S. Ct. 61!, 628, 8x L. ed. 895, 96, io8 A. L. R. 1352, 1370
(1937)"'Actually Section 8 (a) of the Act as Amended by the Taft-Hartley Act.

16

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XI

case it is important to realize that these unfair labor practices fall into
two general categories. First, some acts are considered as unfair per
se-i.e., irrespective of the employer's motives in committing such
acts. Second, other acts are normally lawful and become unfair only if
performed for the purpose of frustrating employees in their attempts
at unionization.
In connection with the first of the aforementioned categories, it
would seem to be self evident that some acts directly and obviously
interfere with the rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively. Such acts are properly proscribed irrespective of the employer's motives. Thus, in National Labor Relations Board v. Star Pub.
Co.2 2 the employer transferred all members of one union and replaced them with members of a rival union. There was no evidence that
the employer had any animosity against unions in general or against
any particular union. The action was taken because the transferred
employees could not perform their assigned duties because of the refusal
of an independent contractor's employees, belonging to a different
union, to cooperate with them. The act of transfer was regarded as an
unfair labor practice, irrespective of the employer's motive.
Examples of acts (pertinent to the problem at hand) which are unfair labor practices irrespective of motive may be found in the cases
of Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board and
National Labor Relations Board v. Le Tourneau Co. of Georgia.23 In
the former case an employee solicited union membership during his
own time but on company premises. The latter case differs only in
the fact that union literature was passed out under the same circumstances. In both cases the employees were discharged for violating rules
against solicitation and against the distribution of literature on the
employer's premises. The employer's rules were general rules against
all types of solicitation and against the distribution of any literature.
There was no evidence that they were aimed particularly against the
solicitation of union membershp or the distribution of union literature. Here, however, motive or purpose made no difference. To prevent
a union employee from soliciting other employees to join the union is
an interference with the right of organization guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act. It has long been recognized that the employer may make
and enforce rules deemed necessary for the efficient administration
097 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
23These two cases were decided together by the United States Supreme Court.
The joint opinion is published in 324 U. S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982, 89 L. ed. 1372, 157 A.
L. R. io8i (1945).
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of its business and premises. 24 Thus, an employer may forbid its employees from usings its premises to solicit membership in any ordinary
political, fraternal, religious or other type of non-labor organization.
The difference between such organizations and labor unions is that
such organizations are protected by no positive law comparable to
Section 7 of the Labor Act.
The Labor Board has recognized that in drawing a line between
those types of employer prohibitions which are unfair labor practices
per se and those which are not, it and the courts must balance the
"statutory rights of employees" against "the property rights of management to conduct its business with efficiency and discipline." 25 Therefore, an employer may forbid all types of solicition, including union
solicitation, during periods its employees are required to work.2"
Thus, the right of employees to solicit union membership upon the
employer's premises must be qualified by the proposition that such
right exists only if both the soliciting employee and the solicited
employee are off-duty at the time-e.g., in the morning before work
starts, in the evening after work has ceased, or during authorized rest
periods. It may be concluded that the courts and the Labor Board
have placed the statutory right of employees above the property rights
of the employer in its premises but below the property rights of the
employer as regards that portion of its employees' time for which
it has contracted. It is doubtful that the employer would have to make
its premises available to the union for organizational purposes at any
time except when employees would be there in the course of their
employment. 27 Even the duty of the employer to permit off-duty so-"C.G. Conn, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., ioS F. (2d) 39o (C. C. A. 7 th, 1939); N.L.R.B.
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946); Home Beneficial
Life Ins. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 157 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A. 4th, 1947) cert. den. 332 U. S. 758,
68 S. Ct. 58, 92 L. ed. 344 (1947); Daykin, Employees' Right to Organize on
Company Time and Company Property (1947) 42 Il.L. Rev. 3oi; Seventeenth
Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board (1952) 114.
-Seventeenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board (1952) 114.
21N.L.R.B. v. William Davies Co., Inc., 135 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943), cert.
den. 32o U. S.77o, 64 S.Ct. 82, 88 L. ed. 460 (1943); Peyton Packing Company, Inc., 49
N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943). In the last cited case the Labor Board used the following
language: "The Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from making and
enforcing reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on company time
Working time is for work. It is therefore within the province of an employer to
promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working
hours...." [italics supplied].
2I have been able to find no authority either for or against this proposition.
The language of the Board seems to place particular emphasis upon "rest periods"
which would imply that the right of employees to use the employer's premises
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licitation upon its premises is not absolute. The employer may be
able to show special circumstances in which an anti-solicitation rule
will be considered legitimate. It has been consistently held that the
proprietor of a store may forbid all solicitation upon the selling
floor, because members of the public might be inconvenienced. 2 Likewise, a past history of inter-union violence may justify a rule forbidding all union solicitation upon the employer's premises when reasonably believed to be necessary to prevent a renewed outbreak of the
trouble. 29 However, it has been held that any rule prohibiting solicitation by employees upon the employer's premises during their offduty time is presumed to be unfair, thus imposing upon the employer
the burden of showing special circumstances sufficient to support the
rule.30 The distinction must be kept clearly in mind between a nonabsolute rule, and a rule in which the question of whether conduct is
unfair or not is dependent upon motive. The distinction will become
important later. Thus the rule which makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to forbid employee organizers from soliciting union
membership during their free time but on company premises is not absolute-i.e., the aplication of said rule to any particular case will depend upon the circumstances of that case. However, in situations in
which the rule is deemed applicable, the employer's motive, whether
or not anti-union, is utterly immaterial.
As indicated above, there is another grand category of employer
unfair labor practices. Acts of management, such as the promulgation of
reasonable rules for the administration of a plant, may not be unfair
per se. But the promulgation and enforcement of such a rule may become unfair labor practices if done for the purpose of interfering with
the exercise of rights vested in employees by the Labor Act.31 Thus,
the employer in Edward G. Bund Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relafor proselyting purposes is restricted to occasions when they are normally there.
N.L.R.B. v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U. S. 226, 69 S. Ct. 541, 93 L. ed. 638 (1949) will
be discussed infra. In that case the employer was required to permit the union to
use a meeting hall owned by the employer. However, it is believed that this
decision was based upon discrimination and not upon the premise that the employer owes an absolute duty to make its premises available to its employees.
-sSeventeenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board (1952)
114. The leading case is N.L.R.B. v. May Department Stores, 154 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A.
8th, i9t6), cert. dcn. 329 U. S. 725, 67 S. Ct. 72, 91 L. ed. 627 (1946).
"nMatter of Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 18 N.L.R.B. 738 (1939).
0N.L.R.B. v. LaSalle Steel Co., 178 F. (2d) 829 (C. A. 7 th, 1949), cert. den. 399
U. S. 963, 70 S. Ct. 996, 94 L. ed. 1372 (1950).
"Carter Carburetor Corp. v. N.L.B.R., 140 F. (2d) 714 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944). See
Notes (1949) 27 N. C. L. Rev. 562, 565; (1951) 26 Notre Dame Law. 342.
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tions Board32 discarged an obviously worthless employee. There were
grounds that justified his discharge, such as intoxication on the job
and consistently reporting for work at times most suitable to himself. The trouble was that his conduct had been long tolerated until
he became active in the C. I. 0. Then he was immediately discharged.
The various prior malfeasances were assigned as the reason for such
action. The timing of the employer's action made the inference that
the worker was really fired because of his union activity inescapable.
There is an old quip: "He wasn't fired because he belonged to the
union but because he left the hammer on the wrong side of the work
bench." Undoubtedly an employer may prescribe rules as to where
tools are to be placed at the end of a working day and can discharge
employees for failure to comply with such rules. The question in
such cases always is: why was the employee discharged? Was it really
because he failed to comply with the rule, or was that just an excuse?
Was the employer's real motive, for the action taken, the employee's
union participation? It is not to be assumed that membership in
a union renders an employee immune to the employer's disciplinary
powers. Union members are as subject to rules as non-union members,
but there is always the question as to why the rules were enforced.
The rule that bad motive on the part of an employer will render
conduct unfair which might otherwise be legitimate, may be regarded
as analogous to the illegal purpose doctrine which has long been
applied to employees. 33. Said doctrine in effect holds that species
of labor activity which do not fall into any established criminal or
tort law category may still be illegal if performed for the purpose of
accomplishing an end regarded by the court as socially undesirable, or
as outside the scope of proper labor objectives,3 4 Propositions regard1071

1 3 8 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) cert. den. 332 U. S. 778, 64 S. Ct. 619, 88 L. ed.

('944).

uGregory, Labor and The Law (1946) 50.
"Perhaps the illegal purpose doctrine has been applied more to the concerted
pressure of unions than to individual activity. Compare Allen v. Flood, [1898]
A. C. i (House of Lords, 1897) with Quinn v. Leathern, [igo] A. C. 495 (House
of Lords, 19o). The illegal purpose doctrine has been the focal point of stormy
controversy, and has been followed to the bitter end, rejected in toto, or accepted
with varying interpretations as to what purposes are proscribed. For sources
indicating the third, and middle course, approach see Crofter Hand Woven Harris
Tweed Co., Ltd. v. Veitch, [1942] A. C. 435, (House of Lords, 1942); Holmes, dissenting in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896); and Gregory,
Labor and the Law (1946) 51. It is doubtful to what extent it can be said that the
illegal purpose doctrine is part of the fabric of our modern labor jurisprudence. The
reasoning underlying the doctrine has been used in diverse situations, however, by
modem courts of the highest standing. For example, in Opera On Tour v. Weber,
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ing motive are always difficult to prove. For that reason the operative
facts of the law are usually capable of an objective determination.
Difficulties in this regard cannot always be avoided, and requirements
of justice will sometimes impose upon a fact-determining body the
problem of ascertaining an actor's subjective intention. If an employer's motives were to be disregarded because difficult to prove, it would
be possible for anti-union employers to deny their employees thcir
rights under the Labor Act while performing acts which in and of themselves do not constitute unfair labor practices.
Discriminatiton is often made the test as to whether an otherwise
innocent act will become unfair. For instance, the National Labor Relations Board has recently said:3 5
"Moreover, an employer violates the act by enforcing an otherwise valid rule in a discriminatory manner.36 Such discrimina285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941) an anti-injunction statute was so construed as
to limit the concept of a "labor dispute," upon which the applicability of the
statute depended, to controversies in which the union purpose was regarded as
legitimate. Likewise, it has been held, in effect, that the purpose for which a strike
is called will be considered in determining whether it is a protected type of labor
activity. N.L.R.B. v. Reynolds International Pen Co., 162 F. (2d) 68o (C. C. A. 7th,
1947). The Labor Board followed a modified version of the same reasoning in
Matter of American News Company, 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944). A striking instance of
the point here made is found in the metamorphosis of the United States Supreme
Court doctrine of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed.
1093 (1940)-i.e., that peaceful picketing is a form of free speech and thus is protected

against adverse state action by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. After undergoing various mutilations the doctrine received a mild
limitation in Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 49 o , 69 S. Ct, 684, 93 L. ed.
834 (1949) in which it was held that such protection does not extend to peaceful
picketing aimed at compelling an employer to perform acts which cannot legally
be done. The limitation which the Giboney decision placed upon the Thornhill
doctrine is unquestionably sound. However, the next step has logically followed, and
the United States Supreme Court now regards peaceful picketing as constitutionally
protected only if the purpose of the picketing is one which the court regards
as legitimate. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. ed. 985
(igo); Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 4 70, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. ed. 995 (195o)'Seventeenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board (1952) 114.
3Board's footnote 54: "See Cherry Rivet Co., 97 NLRB 13o3; The Chesapeake
and Potomac Telephone Co. of West Virginia, 98 NLRB 1122; Cullman Electric
Cooperative, 99 NLRB 88, where the Board pointed out that a company rule which
unlawfully prohibits union solicitation does not become valid merely because
union solicitors and other solicitors are in fact treated alike." In this footnote
the Board has unfortunately failed to point out that in so far as its decision in the
Marshall Field case requires the employer to admit non-employee organizers to its
premises, its order was set aside by the United States Court of Appeals, 2oo F.
(2d) 375 (C. A. 7 th, 1952). Elsewhere in its report the Board does state that its
order in the Marshall Field case was enforced by the United States Court of Appeals "with modifications." The modifications sapped the Board's decision of most
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tion occurs when a valid no-solicitation rule is enforced so as to
prevent union solicitation without also prohibiting other forms
one
of solicitation, or when a valid rule is enforced against
37
union while solicitation by another union is permitted."
The idea seems to be that even though the promulgation of a rule is
not an unfair labor practice per se, it will become one if the rule is
enforced against union organizers but not against other types of solicitors. This factor of discrimination seems to be the basis for the
United States Supreme Court's holding in the recent, leading, and
somewhat controversial decision in National Labor Relations Board v.
Stowe Spinning Co. 3 3 In that case the employer owned a meeting hall
which was entirely separate from those portitons of its premises where
employees did their work. In the Southern mill town where the plant
was located this hall appeared to be the only place suitable for union
meetings. Said hall was under the immediate custody of a local fraternal order which held under some sort of a vague oral understanding.
The fraternal order permitted the hall to be used for all'kinds of local
organizational activity upon payment of a nominal fee sufficient to
defray the additional janitor cost. At the instance of the employer, use
of the hall was forbidden for union meetings, but its use for other types
of community activities was still permitted. The holding of the
Labor Board that such action by the employer constituted an unfair
labor practice was upheld, with modifications, by the United States
Supreme Court. It seems clear from reading the majority opinion that
the Supreme Court based its decision on the ground that the employer's unfair labor practice consisted of discrimination between unions
of its vitality. However, it must be said in favor of the Board's statement that
implicitly the Board clearly regarded the conduct of the employer, which it proscribed, as constituting an unfair labor practice, per se, and thus not dependent
upon motive or upon discrimination as the Board puts it. It was in that regard
that the Board was reversed by the Court of Appeals. This issue between the
Board and the Court is regarded as the crucial problem of this case and will be
discussed fully later in this article. It is here conceded that, if the Board is correct in its position that (under the circumstances of the Marshall Field case) an
employer cannot exclude non-union organizers from its premises, the fact that
the employer's exclusionary rule is applied without discrimination against union
and all outside organizers will not prevent the existence of an unfair labor practice.
It should be noted that even under the court's holding, Marshall Field & Co. would
have been guilty of an unfair labor practice if it had enforced its exclusionary
rule against outside union organizers only and not against all types of nonemployee solicitation.
'Board's footnote 55: "Statement in Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 NLRB 6o8...."
*336 U. S. 226, 69 S. Ct. 541, 93 L. ed. 638 (1949).
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and other types of organizations.3 9 It has been seen above that an
employer may forbid its employees from soliciting union membership
during periods they are supposed to be working. It would seem clear,
however, that an employer who permitted employees to do other
types of solicitation during working hours-e.g., for the Red Cross or
community chest, but forbade them to solicit union membership at
such times, would be guilty of an unfair labor practice.
It might seem that instead of the two categories of unfair labor
practices specified above there are really three: (i) those practices
which are unfair, per se; (2) those which are unfair because of the
employer's anti-union motive; and (3) those which are unfair because
of the employer's practice of discrimination in the enforcement of an
otherwise legitimate rule. However, it is believed that such is not
actually the case but rather that the classification is really twofold
rather than threefold. The third category appears to be really an
important special instance of the second. In other words, motive
and not discrimination is the operative fact. 40 Although the Board
and the courts talk in terms of discrimination more frequently than
in terms of motive, it would seem that discrimination is legally significant as evidence of an anti-union purpose.4 1 If discrimination can be
-The majority uses the following language, 336 U. S. 226, 233, 69 S. Ct. 541, 544,
93 L. ed. 638, 644 (1949):
"In this case, however, the Board did not find that the very denial of the
hall was an unfair labor practice. It found that the refusal by these respondents was unreasonable because the hall had been given freely to
others.... What the board found, and all we are considering here, is discrimination...."
In his dissent (concurred in by the Chief Justice) Mr. Justice Reed indicates a
belief that, absent circumstances of unusual hardship, an employer's property
rights in premises, entirely separate from its productive plant, are so superior to
the employee's organizational rights that the union may even be discriminatorily
excluded from said premises. Mr. Justice Jackson, in an opinion separately concurring with the majority, would seem to agree with Mr. Justice Reed except for
his belief that the employer had effectively placed the hall beyond its control by
its agreement with the lodge.
40
Of course, many of the acts which are expressly made unfair labor practices
by Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act are described in terms of "discrimination." In such cases discrimination, irrespective of motive, is the operative
fact. But such types of discrimination as are expressly made unfair labor practices by
Section
8 really fall into the first category-i.e., they are unfair labor practices per se.
4t
Compare Note (1949) 27 N. C. L. Rev. 562. There a comment on the Stowe Spinning Co. case, interprets the decision in that case as being based on "anti-union bias."
The court itself had based its decision upon discrimination. The North Carolina
Law Review correctly sees that the significance of discrimination is as evidence of
a bad motive. See also Daykin, Employees' Rights to Organize on Company Time
and Company Property (1947) 42 I1. L. Rev. 5oi, at 3o5, 306.
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shown, the existence of an anti-union motive would seem to follow
almost conclusively. The obverse, however, is not necessarily true. A
question of importance in this case is whether the absence of discrimination is affirmative evidence of the absence of an anti-union
bias, or whether it merely constitutes a lack of one important type of
evidence showing hostility to unionism. This question will be consideredly shortly. It is certainly true that an employer's anti-union
bias may be shown in other ways than by showing discrimination. For
instance, an employer may have expressed a hostile attitude toward
unions, 42 or may have been guilty of espionage activity, or may have
43
consistently refused to bargain collectively.
In the Marshall Field case the Labor Board, in its decision adverse to the employer, conceded that the company did not discriminate
in the enforcement of its rule against the entrance of non-employees
into its restricted cafeterias. 44 If it had forbidden solicitation by nonemployee union organizers in such proscribed areas but had permitted
non-employees to solicit in those places for other purposes, there is
no question but that such discrimination would have established the
necessary anti-union purpose to make the enforcement of the rule
against unions an unfair labor practice. Can an anti-union motive
be inferred from any evidence in the case? There was no affirmative
evidence which would support a holding adverse to the employer. The
troublesome problem is whether it was incumbent upon the employer
to show a clear reason for enforcing its rule against union organizers.
In Tomlinson of High Paint,Inc.,45 a rule forbidding employees from
soliciting funds for any organization on company time or company
premises was struck down in regard to its enforcement against unions.
Part of the reason for the Board's action was the "absence of any explanation" for the rule.4 6 If the enforcement of a rule against union
organizers, although the rule is not discriminatorily enforced, does in
fact handicap organizational activities, is there a burden upon the employer to produce evidence (as distinguished from a burden of persuasion) as to why it is necessary, as against the union, to enforce its
12N.L.R.B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 91 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937),
reversed on other grounds, 3o3 U. S. 272, 58 S. Ct. 577, 82 L. ed. 838 (1938).
"3 Cf. Gregory and Katz, note in Labor Law: Cases, Materials, and Comments
(1948) 628 et seq., and Labor Board decisions there cited. Numerous instances of
circumstances from which an anti-union purpose may be inferred are collected.
"98 N.L.R.B. 88, 91 (1952).
158 N.L.R.B. 982
(1944).
4958 N.L.R.B. 982° , 986 (1944).
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rule?47 Certainly a rule which has the effect of restricting union activity must be for a reasonable, non-anti-union purpose. Is it sufficient
that the general need for such a rule be shown, or should a need for
its complete enforcement against everyone, including unions, be shown?
There is no general rule against discriminating in favor of unions,
unless the employer's action rises to the dubious standards of "unlawful assistance." The mere failure to enforce, against unions, a geneial
rule against everybody could hardly fall within the category of assistance forbidden by the Labor Act. It might well be true that an
employer's policy underlying a particular rule would not be compromised if the rule were relaxed where unions are concerned.
The facts of the MarshallField case seem to fall within the analysis
of the last paragraph. It is self-evident why an employer does not open
a special employees' cafeteria to outsiders generally. A company could
not be expected to sell food to non-employees at the drastically reduced prices which prevail there. Also, if members of the public were
allowed to enter and solicit for innumerable causes, only confusion
would result. However, the union involved in the Marshall Field case
made no contention that their non-employee organizers should be allowed to purchase food in the employee-only cafeteria. It is also clear
that the Labor Board in its decision recognized the rights of the employer to place reasonable restrictions upon the appearance of nonemployee organizers in its employee-only restaurants. Footnote 23 to
the Board's opinion is, in part, as follows:
"Respondent may lawfully require that only a limited number
of organizers compatible with the size of the cafeterias and the
number of employees using them be admitted, and is under no
obligation to allow
purchases to be made by these organizers in
48
such facilities.
Since Marshall Field Sc Co. could forbid all other types of outside solicitation in its cafeterias and could limit the number of outside union solicitors, it would seem that the efficient operation of its cafeterias
would not be compromised by decorous solicitation by non-employee
union organizers. Thus, a conclusion might logically have been reached
that the enforcement of its no solicitation rule against union organizers manifests an anti-union motive unless the employer can justify
the application of its rule to union organizers by showing some other
legitimate purpose. It must be inferred that such is not the law.
'-Cf. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 107 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A.
suggesting that such a burden may sometimes exist.
4898 N.L.R.B. 88, 98 (1952).
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The law of the Marshall Field case would seem to be that antiunion bias in the enforcement of a general rule is to be inferred principally from discriminatory enforcement-i.e., enforcement of the
rule against unions and their organizers but not against other members of the public. In the absence of discrimination, as in the Marshall Field case, other affirmative evidence of anti-union motive must
be shown. It appears that there is no burden on the employer to justify
its non-discriminatory enforcement, against union organizers, of its nondiscriminatory rule. Such an assumption seems to underlie even the
Board decision. No attempt was made by the Board to base its decision upon an anti-union motive. In fact, the Board rejects an argument
by the General Counsel which might have been aimed in that direction. 49 The theory underlying the Labor Board's decision was that,
under the circumstances of this case, the enforcement of the employer's
rule against solicitation was per se an unfair labor practice. 50
The final issue then presented again involves a balancing of the
rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Labor Act against
the so-called property right of the employer. 51 Under the circumstances
of the Marshall Field case, is it an unfair labor practice, as a matter of
law and irrespective of motive, for an employer to forbid non-employee
union organizers from soliciting union membership of employees, during their non-working hours but on the employer's premises? Must
the employer make its premises available to union solicitiors for such a
purpose? It has already been seen that, barring special situations such
as the selling floor of a mercantile establishment, an employer cannot
forbid union solicitation on company premises by its employees provided both the soliciting employee and the solicited employee are
off duty at the time. Is there any significant difference between the
two types of solicitors?
The problem here has been faced in but few court decisions prior
to the decision in the Marshall Field case and never as pointedly as in
that case. The few cases, however, have been quite consistent in allowing an employer to exclude non-employee organizers from its
premises, when special circumstances, to be considered later, are absent. In National Labor Relations Board v. Cities Service Oil Co. 52
union representatives were permitted to go on shipboard for the
4

98 N.L.R.B. 88, 98, n. 24 (1952).
109 8 N.L.R.B. 88, 95-98 (1952).
b'98 N.L.R.B. 88, 97-98, esp. n. 21 (1952).
-'122F. (2d) 149 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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purpose of aiding in the processing of grievances by employees already
represented by the union. However, the court made the following
important qualification:
"There can, however, be no reason for giving the representatives of the union passes in order that it may solicit new members or collect dues...
Of like import is National Labor Relations Board v. J.L. Brandies &
Sons.54 That case, like the Marshall Field case, involved a retail department store. One of the questions presented was whether the employer's surveillance of non-employee union organizers, when on the
employer's premises, constituted an unfair labor practice. The court
held that it did not, as follows:
"Respondent could have prohibited proselyting on its premises during business hours. That it did less, certainly can not
subject it to just criticism."55
The United States Supreme Court decision in Republic Aviation Corp.
51
v. National Labor Relations Board56 has already been noted. It
was there held that an employer could not forbid employee organizers
from soliciting upon company premises during their non-working
hours. In that case the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court
of Appeals. The latter court, in its opinion by Judge Learned Hand, 8
in order to distinguish its own holding in the Cities Service Oil Co.
case,59 expressly recognized the distinction between employee union
organivers and non-employee union organizers, as follows:
"The representatives who sought the passes [in the Cities
Service Oil Co. case] were not members of the crews, and had
no right to be on the ships by virtue of their employment, as
Stone had a right to be in the factory in the case at bar. Whether
a union representative shall be allowed to board a vessel, or
enter a plant, merely to electioneer or to collect dues, is one
thing: whether an employee, already lawfully in the plant,
shall be forbidden during his lunch hour to try to persuade his
fellows to join the union, is another ....60
53122 F. (2d) 149, t52 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).

54 45 F. (2d) r56 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944). cert. den. 323 U. S.751, 65 S. Ct. 85, 89 L.
ed. 6oi (1914).
=145 F. (2d) 556, 567 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944), cert. den. 323 U. S. 751, 65 S. Ct. 85,

89 L. ed. 6oi ('9.t4).
"3 2 4 U. S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982, 89 L. ed. 1372, 157 A. L. R. io8i (945).

"'Notes 4 and 23, supra.
M"142 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
0122 F. (2d) 149 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).

00142 F. (2d) 193, 195 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) [italics supplied].
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It seems evident, therefore, that the Marshall Field decision is in line
with prior judicial announcements.
The Labor Board's decision in the Marshall Field case 60 does not
squarely join issue with the judicial precedents cited above. Instead,
it seeks to base its holding upon special circumstances. It is clear
that there are unusual circumstances under which an employer may
be required to allow non-employee union organizers to enter its premises. These circumstances seem to be found in cases involving lumber
camps and coal mining towns. 2 In such cases employees are usually
so isolated from the outside world that it is impossible for them to
avail themselves of the assistance of non-employee organizers unless
0198 N.L.R.B. 88, 95 et seq.

(1952).

w1Most of the decisions have been in Labor Board cases. Illustrative of those
cases are: Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, 31 N.L.R.B. 258 (1941); West Kentucky
Coal Co., lo N.L.R.B. 88 (938); Harlan Fuel Company, 8 N.L.R.B. 88 (1938). In
its decision in the Marshall Field case, 98 N.L.R.B. 88, 95 (1952) the Labor Board
states:
"... in certain instances, notably those concerning lumber camp, maritime,
and company town situations, the Board has held that nonemployee union
representatives must be granted entry to company property where the
physical limitations of the employment locale prevent employees from gaining access to outside contacts for long periods of time or except at the
cost of considerable effort" ......
The only cases cited in support of that statement are found in the IBoard's footnote
16, which is as follows:
"N.L.R.B. v. Cities Service Oil Company, et al., 122 F. 2d 149 (C. A. 2);
N.L.R.B. v. lVeyerhaeuser Timber Company, 132 F. 2d 234 (C. A. 9);
N.L.R.B. v. Stowe Spinning Company, 336 U. S. 226; and Phillips Petroleum
Company, 92 N.L.R.B. 1344."
Although there is authority to support the Board's proposition (as cited above), its
choice of authority is singularly inept. Not one of the cases cited is in point. The
Cities Service Oil Co. case is commented upon in this article (see note 52, supra). It
held just the opposite of the proposition for which the Board cited it. So far from
holding that the employer had to permit non-employee organizers on its premises,
that case held that the employer was not required to admit them. The Weyerhaeuser
Timber Company case cited by the Board does not deal with this problem at all,
but with a factual issue as to whether the employer's discharge of two employees
was motivated by anti-union bias. Apparently the Board has confused the decision
of the Ninth Circuit with a case of its own by the same name (cited supra). The
two cases seem to be unconnected except for the fact that the same employer was
involved in both. The Stowe Spinning Co. case is discussed at length in this
article (see notes 27, 38 and 39). Clearly that decision was based upon discrimination. It did not hold that the employer would have had to admit union organizers
had it not discriminated against them. The Phillips Petroleum Co. case is factually
the same as the Stowe Spinning Co. case and involves the same legal proposition.
The Board's opinion in the Phillips Petroleum Co. case consists principally of a
reliance upon the United States Supreme Court decision in the Stowe Spinning Co.
case.
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said organizers are allowed access to the employer's premises. The only
court decision found along that line is National Labor Relations Board
v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp.63 That case involved an isolated
lumber camp 18 miles from the nearest habitation. There was a rapid
turnover of employees and during their tenure of employment the
employees rarely left the camp. The company's rules permitted one
union organizer to meet the men one evening a week in the recreation
hall. The court held that the Board properly ordered the employer to
permit solicitation in the bunk houses subject to the company's "lights
out" rule.
In the Marshall Field case the Labor Board did not attempt to
assimilate a department store to a lumber camp. It did recognize that
the location of the store and the nature of the employment situation
created special obstacles to organization. 64 However, the Board found
that "such limiting circumstances ... could and do exist in whole
or in part in other types of establishments without unduly impeding
self-organization and concerted activity..."65 Therefore, the Board
did not regard those circumstances as alone sufficient to compel the
employer to allow non-employee organizers to enter restricted areas.
The circumstance which seems to tip the balance against the employer
is a rule in the employer's favor. It is noted above that a department
store proprietor may forbid all union solicitation on the selling floor. 60
In such a place it may even forbid employee organizers who are off
duty from soliciting other employees who are also off duty. This additional handicap to self-organization, together with the fact of staggered
relief hours,6 7 persuaded the Board that the accomplishment of the
F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 6th, 1948).
"'The Board uses the following language, 98 N.L.R.B. 88, 96 (1952):
"At the hearing in this case it was credibly testified by a witness for
the charging union that without access by nonemployee organizers to such
areas, organization of the employees would be a practical impossibility. This
conclusion was based upon the lack of access to employees at other times
because of the physical location of the store on the busiest streets of a large
metropolis, the multitude of entrances and exits, the impossibility of distinguishing between customers and employees at points of access, and the
variety of hours and compensation of employees...."
The compensation difficulty indicated is found in the fact that the company employed a highly competitive system of incentive pay, thus making organization by
employee organizers difficult because of the reluctance of employees to trust and
follow their fellow employees.
'198 N.L.R.B. 88, 96 (1952).
"Note 28, supra.
"Actually Marshall Field 8- Company was extremely generous in its allowance of
rest periods. Every employee was entitled to one and a half hours off during the
63167
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purposes of the Labor Act required that non-employee organizers be
admitted to the employer's restricted areas.
In the essential features above outlined, the Board was reversed by
the United States Court of Appeals. 6s The court's approach to the
case is both legal and factual. The court realized that it was being presented a question of first instance. 9 It also pointed out that, in fact,
there was no element of isolation, and that employees were readily accessible to outside contacts, without the necessity of non-employee organizers entering restricted areas of .the employer's premises. 0 The
significant paragraph in which the court summarized its holding is as
follows:
"The order of the Board directing the company to permit
non-employee organizers to carry on organizational activities
in the employees' restaurants and cafeterias cannot be sustained
unless the employees are 'uniquely handicapped in matter of
self-organization and concerted activity.' We hold that the facts
established in the instant case do not present unique handicaps
of self-organization. The liberal time off policy of the company
affords even greater opportunities for self-organization during
working hours than is the case in many business and industrial
establishments. The employees are not so isolated from outside contacts as to justify non-employee organizers having access
to the cafeterias which are set aside for employees only. We
conclude that the company rule denying access to employees'
restaurants and cafeterias by non-employee union organizers
was not in violation of Sec. 8 (a) (i) of the act." (footnotes omitted).71

As a matter of law the court holds "unique handicaps" to self-organization necessary before an employer can be required to allow nonemployee organizers on his premises. The Board probably agrees with
working day. In some instances this was divided into a one hour lunch period at
noon with fifteen minutes additional mid morning and fifteen minutes more during the afternoon. Other employees had two forty-five minute break periods, one
about the middle of the morning and the other about the middle of the afternoon.
(Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Marshall Field case, 200 F. (2d) 375, 379
(C. A. 7th, 1952).
"200 F. (2d) 375 (C. A. 7th, 1952).
,-'The court states, 2oo F. (2d) 375, 379 (C.A. 7 th, 1952):
"Apparently this is the first case in which the Board has required an employer to permit non-employee union organizers to solicit in employees'
cafeterias or public waiting rooms or washrooms, absent discrimination,
illegal motive, or other special circumstances which the Board did not find
to exist here...."
F. (2d) 375, 379 (C. A. 7th, 1952).
r°2oo
,'oo F. (2d) 375, 381 (C. A. 7 th, 1952).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

3o

[Vol. X1

this. Where the court and the Board differ is as to whether such
"unique handicaps" existed in the Marshall Field case.
In effect the Court of Appeals seems to restrict the doctrine of
"unique handicaps" to cases of isolation such as the lumber camp
cases. Such a restriction ties in with the court's decision in Cities Service Oil Co.7 2 In that case the handicaps to organization were greater
than in the MarshallField case. Ships were in port but a few days, and
members of the crews, when not on board, dispersed rapidly to various
recreation spots. Such a showing was not sufficient to permit non-employee organizers on board for purposes of solicitation.
The conclusion which seems to follow from the authorities is that
rules are not absolute regarding the rights of either employee or nonemployee organizers to use the employer's premises for the purpose of
soliciting union membership. The difference between the two types of
organizers seems to relate to the burden of showing special circumstances. It may be reliably said that, prima facie, employee organizers
may solicit union membership upon the employer's premises at any
time that both the soliciting employee and the solicited employee are
not required to be working. If special circumstances make rules against
such solicitation legitimate (such as the rule against solicitation
on the selling floor of a mercantile establishment) the burden is upon
the employer to show them. On the other hand, normally the employer may forbid solicitation on its premises by non-employee union
organizers. -If "unique handicaps" to self-organization by the employees
exists so as to indicate the necessity of allowing non-employees to
enter the employer's premises, such handicaps must be shown by the
union. Is this difference in treatment between the two types of organizers sound in principle?
Judge Learned Hand sugiests that the difference between employee
and non-employee organizers is explained by the fact that employee
organizers are already legitimately upon the employer's premises whereas non-employees have no privilege to be there unless a special right
is created by virtue of their organizational objectives. 3 This basis of
differentiation is subject to some technical difficulty. A licensee or
invitee upon premises becomes a trespasser if he goes beyond the
purpose of his license or invitation. 74 Therefore, under strict property
F. (2d) 149 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), discussed supra, see notes 52 and 59.
"Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 142 F. (2d) 193, 196 (C. C. A. 2d,
1944), aff'd 324 U. S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982, 89 L. ed. 1372, 157 A. L. R. io8i (1945),
commented upon supra, see notes 58, 59 and 6o.
4
- De Motte v. Arkell, 77 Cal. App. 61o, 247 Pac. 254 (1926); La Veer v. Hanke Iron
& Wire Works, 187 111. App. 481 (1914); Gillaid v. Hoffnian, 103 Kan. 572, 175
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concepts, employees are invitees upon the employer's premises only
for the purpose of work and recreational activities approved by the
employer. When they make a use of the premises not contemplated
by their invitation, they become trespassers. It is recognized that strict
property law has been modified by the Labor Relations Act. To determine the extent of the modification in terms of traditional property
concepts, however, begs the whole question. The line between the
employer's "property rights" and the rights conferred upon employees
by the Labor Act must be drawn by referring to considerations of
public policy. Judge Learned Hand's suggestion, therefore, hardly
furnishes the basis for an analytical distinction between the two types
of union organizers. There is something about his distinction, however,
which appeals to the intuition. It seems to be a proposition of selfevident justice that employees, who come upon an employer's premises
at the employer's invitation and to further its purposes, should have
superior prerogatives, as against the employer, to those of outsiders
whose only motive for entry is to futher a program adverse to the owner
of the premises.
However attractive, and influential, Judge Learned Hand's suggestion may be, it is believed that the soundest basis for applying different rules to employee and non employee union organizers is to be
found by considering the underlying purpose of the Labor Act. The
ultimate end of the Labor Act is to secure, to those who have nothing
to offer but their services, an equitable portion of our entire social
production.7 5 The method by which the Act aims to secure that end
Pac. 395 (1918); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hocker, xii Ky. 707, 64 S. W. 638 (19o);
119 La. 39, 44 So. 120 (19o6); Robinson v. Leighton, 122 Me.
309, 119 At. Sog, 3o A. L. R. 1386, Anno. 1390 (1923); Orcutt v. Kittery Point
Bridge Co., 53 Me. 5oo (1866); Landers v. Brooks, 258 Mass. 1,154 N. E. 265, 49

Glain v. Sparandeo,

A. L. R. 562, Anno. 564 (1926); Guiney v. Union Ice Co., 225 Mass. 279, 114 N. E.
317 (1916); Stickney v. City of Salem, 85 Mass. 374 (1862); Kinney v. Onsted, 113
Mich. 96, 71 N. W. 482, 38 L. R. A. 665 (1897); Kelley v. Lawrence, 195 Mo. 75,
92 S. AV. 1158 (1906); Morrison v. Burgess Sulphite-Fibre Co., 70 N. H. 406, 47
At. 412 (0oo); McAIpin v. Powell, 70 N. Y. 126, 26 Am. Rep. 555 (1877); Aubrey
v. McCarthy, 217 App. Div. 492, 217 N. Y. Supp. 161 (1926); Walsh v. Frey, 116
App. Div. 527, 101 N. Y. Stipp. 774 (19o6); Mayer v. Laux, 18 Misc. 671, 43 N. Y.
Supp. 743 (1896); Gillis v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. rg Pa. St. 129, 98 Am. Dec.
317 (1868).
-Itis realized that the "declaration of policy" set forth in Section One of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1935) states the purpose of that
Act differently. The emphasis there is upon protecting the free flow of commerce
from industrial strife. Such a statement of purpose is necessitated by legalistic
conslderations arising out of our constitutional distribution of powers between
tje federal and the state governments. A consideration of the history of the act
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is by vesting in employees the right to bargain as a unit. To secure
that end, it is evident that unions are a necessary means. It is also
evident that employees will not always be able to accomplish an effective organization without the assistance of professional, non-employee organizers. It must be borne in mind, however, that the
Labor Act was not designed to further unions as such. Any prerogatives
union leaders may have must be supported by showing their utility in
enabling employees to bargain collectively; they cannot be supported
merely by showing their necessity in furthering the development of
unions, or any particular union, as an end in itself. History is replete with examples of institutions, established to accomplish particular purposes, becoming vested interests wholly apart from the purposes they were originally designed to promote.
The employees of any employer have the most real interest and
the only immediate interest in their self-organization. It follows that
the purposes of the Labor Act are well served by allowing them great
latitude in their organizational activities. Professional, outside organizers, as such, have no rights in their own title. A justification of their
exercise of power, in any particular situation, must be derived through
the immediate interests of the employees. If the employees of a particular employer desire to organize, they are undoubtedly entitled to
call upon outside help. It also may be properly assumed that the
purpose of the Labor Act will be best served if professional, nonemployee organizers are permitted to present to employees the benefits
of organization. Absent considerations of "unique handicaps"-i.e.,
isolation of employees-the unions' educational activities can be performed without invading the employer's premises. But, when professional organizers insist upon entering an employer's premises, the
question immediately arises as to whether their primary concern is in
the employees or in increasing the power of their establishment.
Employees may or may not desire to exercise the rights conferred
by the Labor Act. If they do not so desire, the Act imposes no duties
upon them. If the employees are genuinely interested, unionization
can be accomplished by indigenous organizers. Professional organizers
can advise, and perform their legitimate activities wholly outside the
and the social influences leading to its enactment together with a thorough and
discerning reading of Section One itself, leaves unimpaired the conclusion stated
in this article. Section One of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the socalled "Taft-Hartley" Act) does not change the essential picture so far as legislative purposes are concerned. To a great extent it follows the wording of the
original act verbatim. Where changes are found, it is clear that they are not aimed
at changing the fundamental philosophy of the Act.
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employer's premises. It is only necessary for them to contact the few
key employees who will distribute their literature, obtain signatures
upon union cards, and invite the other employees to organizational
meetings to be held in union halls outside the employer's premises.
Gigantic industries have been organized in that way. Thus, we leave
this problem by the same door we entered. The title to this article is in
the form of a question: are unions an end in themselves or a means
to the end of employee self-organization? If regarded as only a means,
the answer to the particular problem here considered becomes clear.

